In General. Audit Method. Except as provided in §A(1)(b) of this regulation, a batch comparison audit shall be conducted in accordance with Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland. Exception to Batch Comparison. If the State Administrator determines that a batch comparison audit cannot be completed prior to the Board of State Canvassers certification, the audit may be conducted using the following methods: Ballot comparison; Ballot polling; or A hybrid of batch comparison, ballot comparison, or ballot polling. Risk Limit. The risk limit shall be 10 percent. Timing of Audit. No later than 17 days after election day, the local board shall provide to the State Board a ballot manifest, in the manner prescribed by the State Board. The local board shall commence a risk-limiting audit no sooner than 21 days after election day. The local board shall complete a risk-limiting audit no later than 2 days before the Board of State Canvassers convenes under Election Law Article, §11-503(a)(1), Annotated Code of Maryland. Public Notice and Observation. A local board shall: At least 3 days before the risk-limiting audit starts, provide notice of the risk-limiting audit by: Sending the notice to the chairman of the county central committee, each candidate for the contest to be audited who is not a candidate of a principal political party, and the State Administrator; Posting the notice on its website; and Posting the notice in a prominent and publicly accessible location at its office; and Allow, to the extent practicable, for public observation of each part of the manual count of ballots of the risk-limiting audit process. The State Board shall: Provide at least 3 days notice of the time, date, and location for conducting risk-limiting audit initiation procedures required in §E of this regulation by posting the notice on its website; and Allow, to the extent practicable, for public observation of risk-limiting audit initiation procedures. Selection of Contests for Audit. Determination of Number of Statewide Contests. No later than the day before the start of the risk-limiting audit, the State Board shall determine the number of contests to be audited as follows: Consider the number of Statewide contests in the election; Consider local boards’ resources, including provisional processing, canvass, and recounts; For a primary election: If one contest is selected, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest on one party’s ballot; If two contests are selected, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest on each party’s ballot; and In a general election, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest. Determination of Statewide Contest. No later than the day before the start of the risk-limiting audit, the State Board shall randomly select from all Statewide contests at least one contest to be audited. Requests by Local Boards to Audit Local Contests. A local board may conduct a risk-limiting audit of a local contest at the discretion of the local board. If a local board conducts a risk-limiting audit of a local contest: All Statewide contests must be completed prior to the commencement of the audit; and The timing of completion of the risk-limiting audit of the Statewide contest may not be affected by the local contest audit. A local board may request the State Administrator’s approval in writing no later than 1 month prior to the election, to use the risk-limiting audit software to conduct the local contest audit. Local Board Preparations for Audit. Ballot Control. Each local board shall store ballots as follow: In a sealed ballot box, with only ballots from the same batch; and With the batch label on the exterior of the ballot box, which identifies the batch as it appears on the ballot manifest. Requirement to Provide Ballot Manifest. Each local board shall provide to the State Board no later than 17 days after election day: A ballot manifest in the manner prescribed by the State Board; An estimate of all provisional and mail-in ballots that have not yet been canvassed; and Certification that all batches listed on the ballot manifest have been verified by the local board as required by the State Board. Initiation of Risk-Limiting Audit. On the day before the first day of the risk limiting audit, the State Administrator shall hold a public meeting during which the State Administrator shall: Select random choice of a seed number to input into risk-limiting audit software; and Using the randomly-selected seed, risk limit, and margin of victory for the contest or contests selected to be audited, determine the ballots to be audited by each local board. Manual Count Procedures. Each election director shall: Prepare for a risk-limiting audit by recruiting and training manual count teams; Instruct teams to use the sort method described in §F(2) of this regulation if one Statewide contest are audited; Instruct teams to use the tally method described in §F(3) of this regulation if more than one Statewide or local contest is audited; Issue the teams batches or voter verifiable paper records chosen by the risk-limiting software for manual count; and Record in the audit log: The team identifier; The voter verifiable paper records issued to the team; and Upon completion, the voter verifiable paper records returned by the team; Enter the vote totals reported by manual count teams on the consolidated tally sheets; Compare the results of the manual count against the voting system results for those voter verifiable paper records; If there are any inaccuracies, retabulate the voter verifiable paper records; If manual and electronic counts agree, complete and sign the tally sheet; and Within 24 hours after completion of the audit, submit the results to the State Administrator. Sort Method. Each manual count team shall: Designate one team member who shall sort and a second team member who shall watch to ensure accuracy; Sort all assigned voter verifiable paper records into one of the following batches: A batch for each candidate or ballot question response for a contest being audited; A batch for voter verifiable paper records without a vote for a contest being audited; A batch for each officially filed write-in candidate for a contest being audited; and A batch for all other write-in votes; If team members do not agree on how a vote should be counted: Refer the voter verifiable paper record to the election director; and For auditing purposes only, accept the election director’s determination of how the vote shall be counted; Once all of the voter verifiable paper records have been sorted, ensure that each team member independently counts the voter verifiable paper records in each batch; If the team members’ results are not identical, retabulate the voter verifiable paper records until obtaining identical results; and When the team members’ results are identical: Record the vote totals on the batch tally sheet; Sign the batch tally sheet; and Give the batch tally sheet and the voter verifiable paper records to the election director. Tally Method. Each manual count team shall: Include one caller, one watcher, and two tally clerks; For each voter verifiable paper record assigned to it: Have its caller call the votes cast in the contests being audited; Have its watcher ensure the accuracy of the calling; and Have its two tally clerks independently record the votes as they are called; Ensure that its tally clerks periodically compare their results; If the tally clerks’ results are not identical, retabulate voter verifiable paper records beginning with the point of the last successful comparison check, and repeat until the two tally clerks obtain identical results; and When all votes assigned to the team have been tallied, ensure that its tally clerks: Record the vote totals on the batch tally sheet; Sign the batch tally sheet; and Give the batch tally sheet and the voter verifiable paper records to the election director. Resolving Electronic Count. If the manual count of results in an audited contest does not confirm the electronic count of results for that contest, the local board of canvassers shall investigate the matter to determine an accurate result, including: A review of all tally sheets and other documentary materials from the risk-limiting audit; A review of all canvass minutes; Interviews with the election director; and Any other information that would explain the difference between the audit and the electronic count of results. No later than 3 days after beginning the investigation, the local board of canvassers shall: Provide to the State Administrator written findings explaining the difference; and If it concludes that the electronic count is inaccurate, adopt corrections to certified results in accordance with Election Law, §§11-308 and 11-401, Annotated Code Maryland.