# COMAR Title 33 — State Board of Elections

## Subtitle 08 — Canvassing

### Chapter 05 — Post-Election Verification and Audit

**Authority:** Election Law Article, §§2-102(b)(4), 2-202(b), 9-403, 11-201, and 11-309(f), Annotated Code of Maryland

**Administrative History:** Effective date:

**Administrative History:** Regulations .01—.04 adopted as an emergency provision effective March 1, 2000 (27:6 Md. R. 636); adopted permanently effective July 10, 2000 (27:13 Md. R. 1213)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .04B, F—H amended as an emergency provision effective July 3, 2002 (29:18 Md. R. 1440); amended permanently effective October 14, 2002 (29:20 Md. R. 1595)

**Administrative History:** Chapter recodified from COMAR 33.08.04 to COMAR 33.08.05 as an emergency provision effective October 4, 2004 (31:20 Md. R. 1483); recodified permanently effective January 6, 2005 (31:26 Md. R. 1868)

**Administrative History:** Regulations .01—.04 repealed and new Regulations .01—.06 adopted effective October 29, 2012 (39:21 Md. R. 1381)

**Administrative History:** Chapter revised effective August 19, 2013 (40:16 Md. R. 1346)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .01 amended effective July 29, 2019 (46:15 Md. R. 656) effective January 13, 2020 (47:1 Md. R. 19)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .01B amended as an emergency provision effective October 2, 2020 (47:22 Md. R. 934); emergency provision expired effective March 30, 2021

**Administrative History:** Regulation .01B amended effective April 27, 2026 (53:8 Md. R. 356)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .04 amended effective December 23, 2013 (40:25 Md. R. 2073)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .04A amended effective February 29, 2016 (43:4 Md. R. 335)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .04A amended as an emergency provision effective October 2, 2020 (47:22 Md. R. 934); emergency provision expired effective March 30, 2021

**Administrative History:** Regulation .05 amended effective March 31, 2025 (52:5 Md. R. 268)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .05A, B amended effective February 29, 2016 (43:4 Md. R. 335)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .06 amended effective April 27, 2026 (53:8 Md. R. 356)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .06B amended effective February 29, 2016 (43:4 Md. R. 335)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .07B amended effective February 29, 2016 (43:4 Md. R. 335)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .08 adopted effective July 29, 2019 (46:15 Md. R. 656)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .08 amended effective April 27, 2026 (53:8 Md. R. 356)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .09 adopted effective July 29, 2019 (46:15 Md. R. 656)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .09 amended effective January 13, 2020 (47:1 Md. R. 19)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .09 repealed effective April 27, 2026 (53:8 Md. R. 356)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .09 adopted effective April 27, 2026 (53:8 Md. R. 356)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .10 adopted effective July 29, 2019 (46:15 Md. R. 656)

**Administrative History:** Regulation .10 amended effective January 13, 2020 (47:1 Md. R. 19)

#### Regulation .01 Definitions.

*COMAR 33.08.05.01*

A. In this chapter, the following terms have the meanings indicated.

B. Terms Defined.

  (1) “Automated software audit” has the meaning stated in Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland.

  (2) “Ballot-level comparison audit” means a type of risk-limiting audit in which the local board examines voter selections on randomly selected individual paper ballots and compares them with corresponding cast vote records.

  (3) “Ballot polling audit” means a type of risk-limiting audit in which the local board examines voter selections on randomly selected ballots.

  (4) “Ballot manifest” means a detailed catalog prepared by the local board listing the batch label, number of ballots, and any other material required by the State Board as necessary to identify ballots for the risk-limiting audit.

  (5) “Batch” means a grouping of ballots by criteria determined by the State Board and individually stored in a ballot box.

  (6) “Batch comparison audit” means a type of risk-limiting audit in which the local board examines voter markings on randomly selected batches of ballots against the voting system counts.

  (7) “Batch label” means the uniform naming convention determined by the State Board that is used to identify the batch of ballots.

  (8) “Cast vote records” means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot.

  (9) “Discrepancy” means the difference between the voting system results and the results of an automated or risk-limiting audit.

  (10) “Manual count” has the meaning stated in Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland.

  (11) “Precinct” includes an early voting center in Regulations .02—.06 of this chapter.

  (12) “Random seed” means a randomly generated number that is used to generate a random number sequence to select ballot cards or batches of ballot cards for audit.

  (13) “Risk limit” has the meaning stated in Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland.

  (14) “Risk-limiting audit” has the meaning stated in Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland.

  (15) “Risk-limiting audit software” means the software used by the State Board in order to conduct the risk-limiting audit.

  (16) “Voter-verifiable paper record” has the meaning stated in Election Law Article, §9-102, Annotated Code of Maryland.

#### Regulation .02 Purpose.

*COMAR 33.08.05.02*

A. The purpose of the verification is to demonstrate and confirm the accuracy of the voting system’s tabulation logic.

B. The purpose of the precinct audit is to confirm that the number of ballots cast equals the number of voters who checked-in to vote at a polling place.

C. The purpose of the absentee and provisional ballot audit is to ensure that each accepted ballot met the application and acceptance criteria and conversely that rejected ballots did not meet the criteria.

#### Regulation .03 Verification and Audit Required.

*COMAR 33.08.05.03*

A. A local board of canvassers may not certify the results of an election until the verification and audit procedures required in this chapter have been completed for that election.

B. The State Administrator shall establish procedures and reporting formats to guide the verification and audit process.

#### Regulation .04 Selection of Precincts.

*COMAR 33.08.05.04*

A. After 8 p.m. on election day, each local board shall randomly select for post-election verification and auditing, the greater of:

  (1) Three precincts with at least 300 registered voters; or

  (2) 5 percent of all precincts used in the election.

B. Each local board shall:

  (1) Select the precincts at an open session of the local board; and

  (2) Provide notice of the open session as required under State Government Article, §10-506, Annotated Code of Maryland.

C. Within 3 days of selecting the precincts, the election director shall forward to the State Administrator a list of the selected precincts.

D. The State Administrator may require the local board to conduct the audit and verification procedures on additional precincts.

#### Regulation .05 Post-Election Verification.

*COMAR 33.08.05.05*

A. Optical Scan Voting Unit. For each precinct selected under Regulation .04, the election director shall:

  (1) Obtain the totals tapes from each optical scan voting unit deployed to that precinct;

  (2) In a manner and format specified by the State Administrator, aggregate the results reported on the totals tapes; and

  (3) Compare those aggregated precinct results against the results for that precinct as reported by the Election Management System.

B. Notification.

  (1) If the verification results and the Election Management System results agree, the election director shall report to the local board of canvassers and the State Administrator accordingly.

  (2) If the verification results and the Election Management System results do not agree:

    (a) The election director shall notify the State Administrator immediately; and

    (b) The local board of canvassers may not certify the election until the cause of the discrepancy is discovered, resolved, and the State Administrator has approved the resolution.

#### Regulation .06 Post-Election Audit — Precincts.

*COMAR 33.08.05.06*

A. Automatic.

  (1) For every precinct in an election, the State Administrator shall produce a report with the following information:

    (a) The number of voters who were checked-in to vote as reported by the electronic pollbooks;

    (b) The number of ballots cast as reported in the Election Management System; and

    (c) The difference, if any, between the number of voters checked-in to vote and ballots cast.

  (2) The election director shall conduct the audit procedures under §B of this regulation for all batches of ballots scanned at that precinct if the State Administrator’s report indicates that the difference between the number of voters checked-in to vote and the number of ballots cast is five or more.

B. Automatic Audit Procedures—Addition of Batches to Risk-Limiting Audit.

  (1) Batches shall be added to risk-limiting audit under COMAR 33.08.05.09. The election director shall:

    (a) Add the batches identified in §A of this regulation to the batches audited by the risk limiting audit; and

    (b) Conduct the audit procedures under this section for each batch of ballots cast at precinct identified under §A of this regulation.

  (2) For each batch being audited, the election director shall also:

    (a) Hand count the signed voter authority cards associated with each voting unit used to scan the batch; and

    (b) Compare the number of signed voter authority cards against the number of ballots cast as reported in the Election Management System.

  (3) If the number of signed voter authority cards does not match the number of ballots cast, the election director shall:

    (a) Review other election materials from the precinct to determine the cause of the difference; and

    (b) Report to the State Administrator the explanation for the difference.

C. Notification. The election director shall report to the local board and the State Administrator the results of the audit.

#### Regulation .07 Post-Election Audit — Absentee and Provisional Voting.

*COMAR 33.08.05.07*

A. The State Administrator shall establish the number of absentee and provisional ballots to be audited.

B. The election director shall randomly select and review:

  (1) Accepted absentee ballots to determine whether each ballot was properly accepted by confirming that:

    (a) A timely absentee ballot request was received from the voter; and

    (b) The absentee ballot was timely received as provided under COMAR 33.11.03.08;

  (2) Rejected absentee ballots to determine whether each ballot was properly rejected by confirming that:

    (a) The absentee ballot was not timely received as provided under COMAR 33.11.03.08; or

    (b) The absentee ballot was rejected for another valid reason;

  (3) Accepted provisional ballots to determine whether each ballot was properly accepted by confirming that:

    (a) On or before election day, the voter was registered to vote and voted the ballot for the precinct in which the voter resides; and

    (b) All other applicable acceptance criteria were met;

  (4) Partially accepted provisional ballots to determine whether each ballot was properly partially accepted by confirming that:

    (a) On or before election day, the voter was registered to vote but did not vote the ballot for the precinct in which the voter resides; and

    (b) All other applicable acceptance criteria were met; and

  (5) Rejected provisional ballots to determine whether each ballot was properly rejected by confirming that:

    (a) On or before election day, the voter was not registered to vote; or

    (b) The voter’s ballot was rejected for another valid reason.

C. Notification. The election director shall provide a copy of the materials reviewed under §B of this regulation to:

  (1) The local board of canvassers at the time of certification; and

  (2) The State Administrator after certification.

D. Certifying the election.

  (1) If the audit demonstrates that an absentee or provisional ballot was improperly rejected, the local board of canvassers shall accept and count the absentee or provisional ballot prior to the certification of the election.

  (2) If the audit demonstrates that absentee and provisional ballots were improperly accepted and that discrepancy is:

    (a) Less than the vote margin of any contest on the ballot in that county, the local board of canvassers shall accept the audit results and certify the election; or

    (b) Greater than the vote margin of any contest on the ballot, the local board of canvassers may not certify until any corrective actions required by the State Administrator are completed.

#### Regulation .08 Post-Election Audit — Ballot Tabulation Audit — In General.

*COMAR 33.08.05.08*

A. Audits Conducted by the State Administrator. The State Administrator shall conduct an automated software audit of the electronic images of all ballots cast:

  (1) After each Statewide primary election; and

  (2) After each Statewide general election.

B. Audit Conducted by the Local Boards. Each local board shall conduct a risk-limiting audit of voter-verifiable paper records after each Statewide election:

C. Reporting of Audit Results.

  (1) The State Administrator shall post on the State Board website:

    (a) Prior to certification of the election by the Board of State Canvassers, the results of the risk-limiting audit, including:

      (i) An overview of the risk-limiting audit process; and

      (ii) An explanation or video of the batch selection process; and

    (b) Within 1 week after certification of election results by the Board of State Canvassers, the results of the automated software audit, including:

      (i) An overview of the automated audit process;

      (ii) The audit reports generated for each county;

      (iii) An explanation of any discrepancy greater than 0.5 percent of total votes cast in any given contest; and

      (iv) Any additional steps taken to resolve any discrepancy.

  (2) Prior to certification of the election by the Board of State Canvassers, the State Administrator shall report the results of the risk-limiting audit to the Board of State Canvassers and the State Board.

#### Regulation .09 Post-Election Audit — Ballot Tabulation Audit — Risk Limiting Audit.

*COMAR 33.08.05.09*

A. In General.

  (1) Audit Method.

    (a) Except as provided in §A(1)(b) of this regulation, a batch comparison audit shall be conducted in accordance with Election Law Article, §11-309, Annotated Code of Maryland.

    (b) Exception to Batch Comparison.  If the State Administrator determines that a batch comparison audit cannot be completed prior to the Board of State Canvassers certification, the audit may be conducted using the following methods:

      (i) Ballot comparison;

      (ii) Ballot polling; or

      (iii) A hybrid of batch comparison, ballot comparison, or ballot polling.

  (2) Risk Limit. The risk limit shall be 10 percent.

  (3) Timing of Audit.

    (a) No later than 17 days after election day, the local board shall provide to the State Board a ballot manifest, in the manner prescribed by the State Board.

    (b) The local board shall commence a risk-limiting audit no sooner than 21 days after election day.

    (c) The local board shall complete a risk-limiting audit no later than 2 days before the Board of State Canvassers convenes under Election Law Article, §11-503(a)(1), Annotated Code of Maryland.

B. Public Notice and Observation.

  (1) A local board shall:

    (a) At least 3 days before the risk-limiting audit starts, provide notice of the risk-limiting audit by:

      (i) Sending the notice to the chairman of the county central committee, each candidate for the contest to be audited who is not a candidate of a principal political party, and the State Administrator;

      (ii) Posting the notice on its website; and

      (iii) Posting the notice in a prominent and publicly accessible location at its office; and

    (b) Allow, to the extent practicable, for public observation of each part of the manual count of ballots of the risk-limiting audit process.

  (2) The State Board shall:

    (a) Provide at least 3 days notice of the time, date, and location for conducting risk-limiting audit initiation procedures required in §E of this regulation by posting the notice on its website; and

    (b) Allow, to the extent practicable, for public observation of risk-limiting audit initiation procedures.

C. Selection of Contests for Audit.

  (1) Determination of Number of Statewide Contests. No later than the day before the start of the risk-limiting audit, the State Board shall determine the number of contests to be audited as follows:

    (a) Consider the number of Statewide contests in the election;

    (b) Consider local boards’ resources, including provisional processing, canvass, and recounts;

    (c) For a primary election:

      (i) If one contest is selected, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest on one party’s ballot;

      (ii) If two contests are selected, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest on each party’s ballot; and

    (d) In a general election, require auditing of at least one Statewide contest.

  (2) Determination of Statewide Contest.  No later than the day before the start of the risk-limiting audit, the State Board shall randomly select from all Statewide contests at least one contest to be audited.

  (3) Requests by Local Boards to Audit Local Contests.

    (a) A local board may conduct a risk-limiting audit of a local contest at the discretion of the local board.

    (b) If a local board conducts a risk-limiting audit of a local contest:

      (i) All Statewide contests must be completed prior to the commencement of the audit; and

      (ii) The timing of completion of the risk-limiting audit of the Statewide contest may not be affected by the local contest audit.

    (c) A local board may request the State Administrator’s approval in writing no later than 1 month prior to the election, to use the risk-limiting audit software to conduct the local contest audit.

D. Local Board Preparations for Audit.

  (1) Ballot Control. Each local board shall store ballots as follow:

    (a) In a sealed ballot box, with only ballots from the same batch; and

    (b) With the batch label on the exterior of the ballot box, which identifies the batch as it appears on the ballot manifest.

  (2) Requirement to Provide Ballot Manifest. Each local board shall provide to the State Board no later than 17 days after election day:

    (a) A ballot manifest in the manner prescribed by the State Board;

    (b) An estimate of all provisional and mail-in ballots that have not yet been canvassed; and

    (c) Certification that all batches listed on the ballot manifest have been verified by the local board as required by the State Board.

E. Initiation of Risk-Limiting Audit. On the day before the first day of the risk limiting audit, the State Administrator shall hold a public meeting during which the State Administrator shall:

  (1) Select random choice of a seed number to input into risk-limiting audit software; and

  (2) Using the randomly-selected seed, risk limit, and margin of victory for the contest or contests selected to be audited, determine the ballots to be audited by each local board.

F. Manual Count Procedures.

  (1) Each election director shall:

    (a) Prepare for a risk-limiting audit by recruiting and training manual count teams;

    (b) Instruct teams to use the sort method described in §F(2) of this regulation if one Statewide contest are audited;

    (c) Instruct teams to use the tally method described in §F(3) of this regulation if more than one Statewide or local contest is audited;

    (d) Issue the teams batches or voter verifiable paper records chosen by the risk-limiting software for manual count; and

    (e) Record in the audit log:

      (i) The team identifier;

      (ii) The voter verifiable paper records issued to the team; and

      (iii) Upon completion, the voter verifiable paper records returned by the team;

    (f) Enter the vote totals reported by manual count teams on the consolidated tally sheets;

    (g) Compare the results of the manual count against the voting system results for those voter verifiable paper records;

    (h) If there are any inaccuracies, retabulate the voter verifiable paper records;

    (i) If manual and electronic counts agree, complete and sign the tally sheet; and

    (j) Within 24 hours after completion of the audit, submit the results to the State Administrator.

  (2) Sort Method. Each manual count team shall:

    (a) Designate one team member who shall sort and a second team member who shall watch to ensure accuracy;

    (b) Sort all assigned voter verifiable paper records into one of the following batches:

      (i) A batch for each candidate or ballot question response for a contest being audited;

      (ii) A batch for voter verifiable paper records without a vote for a contest being audited;

      (iii) A batch for each officially filed write-in candidate for a contest being audited; and

      (iv) A batch for all other write-in votes;

    (c) If team members do not agree on how a vote should be counted:

      (i) Refer the voter verifiable paper record to the election director; and

      (ii) For auditing purposes only, accept the election director’s determination of how the vote shall be counted;

    (d) Once all of the voter verifiable paper records have been sorted, ensure that each team member independently counts the voter verifiable paper records in each batch;

    (e) If the team members’ results are not identical, retabulate the voter verifiable paper records until obtaining identical results; and

    (f) When the team members’ results are identical:

      (i) Record the vote totals on the batch tally sheet;

      (ii) Sign the batch tally sheet; and

      (iii) Give the batch tally sheet and the voter verifiable paper records to the election director.

  (3) Tally Method. Each manual count team shall:

    (a) Include one caller, one watcher, and two tally clerks;

    (b) For each voter verifiable paper record assigned to it:

      (i) Have its caller call the votes cast in the contests being audited;

      (ii) Have its watcher ensure the accuracy of the calling; and

      (iii) Have its two tally clerks independently record the votes as they are called;

    (c) Ensure that its tally clerks periodically compare their results;

    (d) If the tally clerks’ results are not identical, retabulate voter verifiable paper records beginning with the point of the last successful comparison check, and repeat until the two tally clerks obtain identical results; and

    (e) When all votes assigned to the team have been tallied, ensure that its tally clerks:

      (i) Record the vote totals on the batch tally sheet;

      (ii) Sign the batch tally sheet; and

      (iii) Give the batch tally sheet and the voter verifiable paper records to the election director.

  (4) Resolving Electronic Count.

    (a) If the manual count of results in an audited contest does not confirm the electronic count of results for that contest, the local board of canvassers shall investigate the matter to determine an accurate result, including:

      (i) A review of all tally sheets and other documentary materials from the risk-limiting audit;

      (ii) A review of all canvass minutes;

      (iii) Interviews with the election director; and

      (iv) Any other information that would explain the difference between the audit and the electronic count of results.

    (b) No later than 3 days after beginning the investigation, the local board of canvassers shall:

      (i) Provide to the State Administrator written findings explaining the difference; and

      (ii) If it concludes that the electronic count is inaccurate, adopt corrections to certified results in accordance with Election Law, §§11-308 and 11-401, Annotated Code Maryland.

#### Regulation .10 Post-Election Audit — Ballot Tabulation Audit — Automated Audit.

*COMAR 33.08.05.10*

A. The State Administrator shall complete the automated audit of:

  (1) Early voting and election day results before the local boards of canvassers certify the election results; and

  (2) Absentee and provisional results before the State Board of Canvassers certifies the election results.

B. The State Administrator shall not provide the entity performing the automated audit software with detailed results from the voting system until the entity provides the State Administrator with the results generated by the audit.